FILED 2804 JAN -7 PM 3: 49 JAMES C. BRAZELTON District Attorney 2 Stanislaus County Courthouse 3 Modesto, California Telephone: 525-5550 4 Attorney for Plaintiff 5 6 7 8 STANISLAUS COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 9 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 -----11 1050667 D.A. No. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA No. 1050667 12 13 Plaintiff,) Hrq: 1-14-04 Time: 8:30 am 14 vs. Dept: TBA

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant.

PEOPLE'S OPPOSITION

TO SET ASIDE THE INFORMATION (PENAL CODE SECTION 995)

TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION

Between October 29, 2003, and November 18, 2003, the preliminary hearing was held in this case. The Honorable Al Girolami, sitting as a magistrate, held the defendant to answer for two counts of murder, a violation of Penal Code Sec. 187, with the special circumstance of multiple murder, a violation of Penal Code Sec. 190.2(a)(3). An information charging the defendant with the above-listed crimes was filed on December 1, 2003.

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SCOTT LEE PETERSON,

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The California Supreme Court has stated the standard of review for proceedings under Penal Code Section 995.

it is the magistrate who is the finder of fact; the superior court has none of the foregoing powers, and sits merely as a reviewing court; it must draw every legitimate inference in favor of the information, and cannot substitute its judgment as to the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of the magistrate. . . " (People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718, emphasis added.)

See also, <u>People v. Jones</u> (infra), 301, where the court again cites the above passage.

I. CORPUS DELICTI HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED

As the California Supreme Court stated in <u>People v. Jones</u> (1998) 17 Cal,4th 279, 301,

"[t]he corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements: the fact of the injury, loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as to its cause [cite]; In any criminal prosecution, the corpus delicti must be established by the prosecution independently from the extrajudicial statements, confessions or admissions of the defendant [cite]. independent proof may consist of circumstantial evidence, and need not establish the crime beyond a reasonable doubt [cite]. The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to assure that the accused is not admitting to a crime that never occurred The amount of independent proof of a crime required [cite]. for this purpose is quite small; we have described this quantum of evidence as slight [cite] or minimal [cite]. People need make only a prima facie showing, permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed [cite]. inference need not be the only, or even the most compelling one but need only be a reasonable one [cite]."

"[w]e have never interpreted the corpus delicti rule so strictly that independent evidence of every physical act constituting an element of an offense is necessary. Instead, there need only be independent evidence establishing a slight or prima facie showing of some injury, loss or harm, and that a criminal agency was involved." Jones, supra, 303-304.

Two other cases cited in Jones, supra, at 302-303, are also

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instructive. In <u>People v. Jennings</u>, (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 369, the body of the victim, a known prostitute, was found in an irrigation canal in a rural area. She was unclothed, and although forensic examination detected she had suffered a broken jaw, the advanced decomposition of her body made determining whether she had been sexually assaulted impossible. More specifically, there was no independent evidence that the defendant ever sexually penetrated the victim. Despite the lack of any independent evidence of sexual penetration, the California Supreme Court found that the corpus delicti of rape was established.

Similarly, in <u>People v. Robbins</u>, (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 885-886, the evidence showed that the victim, a six year-old boy, was last seen riding on a motorcycle with an unknown blonde haired man. The boy's skeletal remains were found three months later. The victim's neck had been broken and his body was found unclothed. The defendant had been diagnosed as a pedophile. Although the decomposed remains of the victim could not establish whether he had been sexually assaulted before his death, the defendant made an extrajudicial admission that he abducted the victim and sexually assaulted him before strangling him. The California Supreme Court found the trial court properly admitted the confession over a corpus delicti objection [cite].

"In view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of the case (i.e. the body was not discovered for some time, hence it was impossible to verify the sexual conduct by scientific evidence, and there were apparently no eyewitnesses to the crime) we do not believe the corpus delicti rule can be interpreted to call for more; the law does not require impossible showings."

Here, the defendant's argument that the corpus delicti was not

established consists of the bald assertions that (1) there was no evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing that Conner Peterson died inside Laci's womb; and (2) no evidence was introduced that proved that Laci and Conner's deaths were brought about by criminal means (defendant's brief, page 5).

The allegation regarding Conner's death while inside Laci's body should be summarily rejected. Although the defendant chooses to ignore it, there was extensive preliminary hearing testimony by Dr. Brian Peterson regarding his opinion that Conner died in utero and was expelled from Laci's body during the decomposition process shortly before his body washed ashore (RT 1465-1467, 1470, 1485-1486, 1516-1518).

Likewise the allegation that there was no evidence that Laci and Conner's deaths were brought about by criminal means should also be dismissed. As Dr. Peterson testified, the Contra Costa Coroner determined that the manner of death in this case was homicide (1477). Thus, the corpus delicti was established. Nothing more was required for preliminary hearing.

The defendant makes the claim, however, based on that fact that Dr. Peterson was unable to determine the cause of death of either Laci or Conner due to their states of decomposition (RT 1474). There is no requirement in the law that, in order to prove a murder, the cause of death of the victim must be shown. If that were the case, it would foreclose prosecution of any murder where the body was too decomposed to determine the cause of death. The law does not impose such stringent requirements [See, People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 931-932; People v. Kraft (2000) 23

Cal.4th 978, 1057; <u>People v. Jennings</u> (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 369; and, <u>People v. Smart</u> (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 860, 865-866.]

In fact, it is well established that the prosecution does not even have to produce a body in order to successfully prosecute a murder. In <u>People v. Scott</u> (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 458, 489, the defendant murdered his wife. Her body was never recovered. The defendant in that case made the exact claims made being made here.

"Appellant contends that since no body was produced, no direct evidence of death was introduced and there was no confession, the People's case was based upon mere suspicion and conjecture."

"If this contention is valid it would mean that a man could commit a secret murder and escape punishment if he was able to completely destroy the body of his victim, however complete and convincing the circumstantial evidence of guilt. No one would say the law should be powerless to uncover such a crime and inflict punishment unless the accused had made a confession. The question, however, is whether it is so inadequate. We hold it is not."

"All that is required to prove death is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convince the minds of reasonable men of the existence of the fact." Scott, supra 490.

[See also, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Harris (1991) 938 F.2d 401, 411-416, also, fn 10-14; People v. Johnson (1991), 233 Cal.App.3d 425, 440-4442; and People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 610-611.]

Here, testimony was introduced that On April 13th and 14th, 2003, Conner and Laci Peterson's bodies were found washed up on the shoreline along the San Francisco Bay (Stipulation of Parties). Both bodies were in an advanced state of decomposition (RT 1470), and Laci's body had been in a marine environment for a period of months (RT 1473). In contrast, Conner's body had been in the water for, at most, only a few days (RT 1506). When found, Laci's body

was clothed in khaki colored maternity pants, a bra, and panties. There was a strand of duct tape attached to the waistband of Laci's pants that ran to her back (RT 1462); Laci Peterson last spoke to Sharon Rocha on December 23, 2002, at 8:30 p.m. According to Ms. Rocha, Laci confirmed plans to meet them for dinner on December 24, 2002 (RT 429). Laci was happy about her pregnancy and eagerly awaiting the birth of her son (RT 424). Amy Rocha testified that she last saw Laci at 5:45 p.m. on December 23, 2002 when Laci and the defendant arrived at her hair salon. Laci was wearing khaki colored maternity pants at that time (RT 397).

There are only three possible scenarios that would explain how Laci and Conner's bodies came to be located in the San Francisco Bay: (1) a pregnant Laci was killed at the hands of another [the defendant] and placed into the San Francisco Bay (therefore proving the corpus delicti); (2) a pregnant Laci was in an accident that somehow resulted in both bodies being in the San Francisco Bay; or (3) a pregnant Laci committed suicide at the San Francisco Bay. Obviously, the second two "possibilities" are ludicrous. There has never been any evidence that supports either that Laci was in an accident at the Bay, or that she committed suicide at the Bay.

The defendant did not make any statements that Laci accompanied him to the San Francisco Bay. In fact, the defendant said that Laci was mopping the floor when he left home on December $24^{\rm th}\,(RT~793)$. There was also no other evidence that Laci voluntarily left her home to go to the San Francisco Bay. Her Land Rover automobile was parked in the driveway when the police arrived (RT 768-769); her keys, purse, and other personal effects

were still in her bedroom (RT 479).

Likewise, there was no evidence that Laci committed suicide at the Bay. On December 15, 2002 Laci spent the evening with Sharon Rocha and Ron Grantski who did not detect any emotional problems with her (RT 427); she was extremely happy with her pregnancy (RT 424); she had made plans to spend the holidays with her family (RT 429); other than complaining about nausea and dizziness while walking, she was in good physical health (RT 1274-1279). Finally, her Land Rover, keys, and other personal effects were found at her home on December 24, clearly indicating she did not leave voluntarily.

Thus, the evidence leads only to the conclusion that Laci was killed at the hands of another [the defendant] and her pregnant body was deposited in the San Francisco Bay. Clearly, the corpus delicti of Laci and Conner's murder was established at the preliminary hearing.

II. <u>STANDARD AT PRELIMINARY HEARING IS PROBABLE CAUSE</u> Penal Code section 866 was amended to redefine, in subdivision (b), the purpose of a preliminary hearing as follows:

It is the purpose of a preliminary examination to establish whether there exists probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a felony. The examination shall not be for the purposes of discovery.

The sole purpose of the preliminary examination is to establish whether there exists probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a felony. The evidence presented was sufficient for the magistrate to make a finding that there was the requisite probable cause. This is all that is required for a preliminary hearing. It is no longer meant to be a mini-trial.

The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was clearly sufficient to meet the requirements for an order to hold the defendant to answer. The burden on the People at a preliminary examination is to "produce evidence that there is a reasonable probability, enough to induce a strong suspicion in the mind of a man of ordinary caution or prudence, that a crime has been committed and that defendant is guilty." (Garabedian v. Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 124, 126-127.)

The rules governing what constitutes a "strong suspicion" are well established. They are:

- 1. Evidence need not be sufficient to support a conviction. (People v. Hampton (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 193, 200.)
- 2. The evidence need only show a "reasonable suspicion" of the defendant's guilt. (People v. Hall (1972) 3 Cal.3d 992, 996; People v. Park (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 550, 561.)
- 3. If <u>some evidence</u> supports the information the sufficiency of the evidence is not in issue. (<u>Rideout v. Superior Court</u> (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474; (<u>People v. Patino</u> (1978) 95 Cal.App.3d 11, 25.)
- 4. The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the magistrate as to the weight of the evidence. (Rideout v. Superior Court, supra; People v. Hall, supra; People v. Patino, supra; People v. Park, supra; People v. Claflin (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)
- 5. Conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the magistrate's determination. (People v. Hall, supra; People v. Park, supra; People v. Martin (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 444, 446; People v. Beasley (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 71, 78.) The magistrate heard the testimony and was able to evaluate on a first-hand basis the truthfulness and accuracy of the witnesses.
- 6. All legitimate inferences are drawn in favor of the Information, (Coughlin v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 461, 464-465; People v. Hall, supra; People v. Patino, supra; People v. Hampton, supra; Rideout v. Superior Court, supra; People v. Park, supra; People v. Claflin, supra.) and the reviewing court may not draw inferences contrary to those reasonably drawn by the magistrate.

(<u>People v. O'Leary</u> (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 323, 328; <u>People v. Lovejoy</u> (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 883, 885.)

7. If there was a rational ground for the magistrate to assume the possibility that the defendant is guilty of the offense, the Information may not be set aside. (People v. Hampton, supra; People v. Mardian (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 16, 38, overruled on other grounds.)

(1973) People v. Harmon 33 Cal.App.3d 308, also illustrative on the reviewing standard that the Superior Court must employ when ruling on a 995 motion. In that case, the defendant, a woman, walked into the Los Angeles Police Department and said "I want to report a murder." She gave her name, address, identification and stated that "I shot him. He jumped on me and I shot him, " or "I killed him." In <u>Harmon</u>, the court was ruling on whether or not a 995 motion was properly granted dismissing an information against the defendant for murder. The court held that it was not. The court stated that "An information will not be set aside if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it, " Harmon, supra, quoting Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474, the court went on to say,

"On a motion to set aside an information, the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant is not before the court, nor does the issue concern the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a judgment of conviction. The court is only to determine whether the magistrate, acting as a man or ordinary caution or prudence, could conscientiously entertain a reasonable suspicion that a public offense had been committed in which the defendant had participated," Harmon at 310.

Here, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence for the magistrate to hold the defendant to answer. At the outset, it must be noted that the defendant ignores most of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. Thus, the People

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will not rehash every piece of evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing. The People will limit their response solely to the defense allegations. The People will assume that the reviewing court is familiar with the whole record and all physical exhibits introduced as evidence.

III. THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING PROBABLE CAUSE

The defendant first claims that there is no physical evidence which supports a finding of probable cause. That is not correct. There was extensive testimony that two hair fragments were attached to a pair of needle nose pliers found under the seat in the defendant's boat. The hair was found wrapped around and through the jaws of the pliers (RT 1536-1537). Both fragments had crushed and splayed ends as if a mechanical force was applied to them (RT 1364-1366). Both hair fragments were missing a root. Shed hairs typically show evidence of a type of hair root (RT 1401-1402). Thus, the inference is that the hairs got onto the pliers through some mechanical means. They weren't shed or transferred passively onto the pliers.

Both hair fragments matched Laci Peterson's hair by microscopic examination (RT 1357-1358). One hair fragment was tested further for mitochondrial DNA comparison and it matched Laci Peterson's mitochondrial DNA profile. That fragment was positively excluded as coming from Scott Peterson (RT 129-130).

There was no evidence that Laci Peterson had been inside the boat, or warehouse, or that she even knew that the defendant had bought a boat. The defendant purchased the boat on December 9, 2002 (RT 795-796). Sharon Rocha testified that she did not know

the defendant had bought the boat until December 24th. testified that she and Ron Grantski had dinner with Laci and the defendant on December 15th; neither mentioned the boat in spite of the fact that both Laci and the defendant knew that Ron Grantski was an avid fisherman and would have been interested in hearing about the boat (RT 426-428). Sharon Rocha also testified that Laci frequently told her about purchases she and the defendant made including new cars, furniture, and a pool for their home (RT 449). Similarly, Amy Rocha testified that she was with Laci and the defendant on December 23rd and neither mentioned the boat (RT 404). It logically follows that, if Laci did not know about the boat and her hair fragments weren't passively transferred there, the only way the hair fragments got onto the pliers and into the boat was if the defendant caused them to be there. The clear inference from the evidence is that the defendant used the pliers in his attempt to hide Laci Peterson's body in the boat and her hair fragments stuck to the pliers.

The defendant next claims that Department of Justice Criminalist Sarah Yoshida's examination showed that the pliers were rusted and had not been used for a substantial period of time. That was correct at the time of the her examination. However, as Criminalist Rod Oswalt testified, the pliers were not examined by Ms. Yoshida until February 26, 2003-two full months after December 24, 2002 (RT 1405). Mr. Oswalt also testified items, such as tools, will start to rust immediately after being exposed to salt water (RT 1405-1406). One would fully expect the pliers to be rusted after being exposed to salt water (from their trip to the

San Francisco Bay with the defendant) and then not being examined until two months later.

IV. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS PROBABLE CAUSE

The defendant next makes the untenable argument that there was no circumstantial evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing from which one could infer the defendant's guilt. All of the circumstantial evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing was clear and unequivocal evidence of the defendant's guilt.

The fact that the defendant said he went "fishing" in the exact area where the bodies were found (RT 802) was enough evidence in and of itself for the magistrate to hold the defendant to answer. Coupled with the additional facts that Laci's body had been in the water for a period of months (the exact time frame from when she was reported missing on December 24th), and that the defendant couldn't say what he was fishing for (RT 483), there is no question that the defendant was properly held to answer.

Additionally, evidence was introduced that the defendant met Shawn Sibley in October 2002 and asked for help in finding a serious relationship. Shawn Sibley then introduced the defendant to Amber Frey (RT 1160-1161). The defendant began an affair with Ms. Frey on November 19, 2002. On December 6th, Ms. Sibley learned the defendant was married. Upon confronting the defendant with that information, the defendant started to cry and became hysterical. He told Ms. Sibley that he had lost his wife. He begged her not to tell Amber, and that he would tell her himself (RT 1162-1163).

On December 8th, the defendant researched tide information for

the San Francisco Bay (RT 1587).

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On December 9th, the defendant bought a 14-foot aluminum boat (RT 795) and tearfully told Amber that he lost his wife and that this would be his first holiday season without her (RT 1656). He accompanied Amber to her Christmas formal on December 14th (RT 1657). Also, during the latter part of December 2002, he told Amber that he was out of the country and would be back around the end of January 2003. He said that they would be able to be more exclusive with each other after that time (RT 818, 1661, People's 149).

The defendant contacted Amber numerous times after Laci was reported missing and continued to lie to her about his true status as Laci's husband. It wasn't until Amber confronted him on January 6, 2003 that the defendant finally admitted that he was Laci Peterson's husband and that he had been lying all along. The defendant continued to contact Amber even after that time; he finally stopped when Amber told him not to contact her on February 19th (RT 1663).

During the month of January 2003, extensive searches were being made of the San Francisco Bay by law enforcement (defendant's exhibit of Modesto Bee articles). Testimony was introduced that the defendant made surreptitious trips to the Berkeley Marina on January 5th, January 6th, and January 9th (RT 1152-1158). Each time the defendant gazed briefly out over the San Francisco Bay and then quickly left the marina.

Laci Peterson was last seen by Amy Rocha with the defendant on December $23^{\rm rd}$ wearing khaki colored maternity pants (RT 397). The

last time anyone other than the defendant spoke to Laci was when Sharon Rocha briefly spoke to her at 8:30 p.m. on December 23rd (RT 429). On April 14th Laci Peterson's body was recovered along the shore of the San Francisco Bay wearing khaki colored maternity pants (RT 1462).

The defendant told Det. Brocchini that he left home at 9:30 a.m. on December 24th and traveled directly to his shop at 1027 North Emerald Street. (RT 799). The defendant's shop is serviced by a cell phone tower at 929 Woodland Ave. (RT 1621). The defendant's home at 523 Covena is serviced by a cell phone tower located at 1250 Brighton Avenue. Cell phone records show that the defendant used his phone at 10:08 a.m. on December 24th and the call started at the 1250 Brighton cell phone tower. The call finished at the cell phone tower located at 10th and "D" streets indicating the defendant was traveling west and had not yet arrived at his shop (RT 1620).

The defendant told Det. Brocchini that when he left the house at 9:30 a.m. on December 24th Laci was mopping the floor. She was wearing black pants and a white shirt. He also said that Laci had plans to walk the dog and prepare for a Christmas brunch (RT 798). The defendant also denied that he was involved in an extramarital affairs.

Karen Servas testified that she found the defendant's dog in the street in front of her house at 10:18 am (RT 1217).

As was later proven, everything the defendant said to Det. Brocchini was a lie. He did not leave his home until sometime after 10:00 a.m.; Laci was not wearing black pants; the maid had

mopped the floor the previous day (RT 372); and, he was involved in a very serious extramarital affair.

As the above facts readily prove, there was more than sufficient evidence for the magistrate to hold the defendant to answer. Indeed, the defendant himself doesn't appear to seriously question that he was properly held to answer. Instead, the defendant claims throughout his motion that the Modesto Police Department "ignored extremely credible leads" that would lead to other suspects, or scenarios. The defense lists only one example in support of this allegation—that being the statement of Diane Campos who was interviewed by Det. Phil Owen. The defense takes offense at Det. Owen stating that he felt that Diane Campos's information wasn't going in the right direction. That this is the only example that can be cited by the defense in support of their allegation speaks volumes about the credibility of their claim.

Diane Campos told Det. Owen that, on December 24th, she saw a woman who looked like Laci Peterson walking through Dry Creek park with two men and a golden retriever near Scenic Hospital. She said the woman was pregnant and was wearing a white top and sweat pants of unknown color (RT 1310-1311). She said she saw these people at 10:45 a.m. (RT 1413). Now, it is hard to imagine what the defense is complaining about. It is undisputed that Karen Servas found the defendant's dog in the street at 10:18 a.m. It would, therefore, be impossible for the woman who Diane Campos claimed to have seen to be Laci Peterson and any such contention should be rejected.

Based on the law, the p

Based on the law, the physical exhibits, and the testimony at the preliminary hearing, it is clear that the defendant was properly held to answer.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, the People respectfully request that the defendant's motion to dismiss the information pursuant to Penal Code Section 995 be denied.

Dated this 8th day January, 2003, at Modesto, California.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES C. BRAZELTON District Attorney

Rick Distaso

Deputy District Attorney

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JAMES C. BRAZELTON District Attorney

DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Court House

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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY FAX 1 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA ss. 3 COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 4 I, the undersigned, say: 5 I was at the time of service of the attached PEOPLE'S 6 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE INFORMATION 7 (PENAL CODE SECTION 995) over the age of eighteen years. 8 by fax a copy of the above-entitled document(s) on the $7^{\rm th}$ day of 9 January, 2004, delivering a copy thereof to the office(s) of: 10 Mark Geragos Attorney for Defendant 11 Fax No. (213)625-1600 12 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is 13 true and correct. 14 Executed this 7th day of January, 2004, at Modesto, 15 California. 16 D. Will 17 18 19 dmh 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27