Reply Memorandum Motion To Set Aside Information

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FILED 04 JAN 14 AM 8: 54 CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT GERAGOS & GERAGOS 1 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 2 LAWYERS 39™ FLOOR 3 350 S. GRAND AVENUE LOS ANGELES, CA 90071-3480 4 TELEPHONE (213) 625-3900 FACSIMILE (213) 625-1600 5 SBN 108325 MARK J. GERAGOS Attorneys for Defendant б SCOTT LEE PETERSON 7 THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE IN COURT FOR THE 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF STANISLAUS FILED BY FAX 10 11 Case No. 1056770 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 12 CALIFORNIA, REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 13 Plaintiff, MOTION TO SET ASIDE INFORMATION 14 VS. (Penal Code Section 995) SCOTT LEE PETERSON, et al., 15 DATE: January 14, 2004 16 TIME: 8:30 a.m. Defendant. PLACE: Dept. 4 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2б 27

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I. Introduction

The District Attorney's Opposition to Scott Peterson's Motion to Set Aside the Information illustrates the enormous gap between the actual evidence in this case (or, more precisely, the lack thereof) and the prosecution's assertions. Although the Opposition argues that the record establishes a corpus delicti and probable cause against Mr. Peterson, it is unable to explain how the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing gives rise to either. The prosecution's argument is at bottom predicated upon default assumptions and nothing more - that is, that the deaths must have been murder and that Mr. Peterson must have committed the crime - rather than upon actual evidence as required. In essence, all that the prosecution has established is that Scott Peterson was an adulterer, and that he was at San Francisco Bay on December 24, 2002, the day Laci disappeared. That, without more, is not enough. The prosecution's mere stringing together of isolated pieces of evidence and assumptions without any coherent theory of the case does not satisfy the People's burden of establishing a corpus delicti or of showing probable cause. The information should be set aside.

II. ARGUMENT

The Prosecution Has Not Established A Corpus Delicti For Murder.

In the Opposition, the prosecution has its corpus delicti argument backwards. It presents three explanations for the cause of Laci's death, declares two of them to be "ludicrous," and concludes that as a result, the only other remaining explanation - homicide is thus established. The prosecution apparently forgets that it is not the defense's burden to prove alternative explanations for a death in a homicide case, but the prosecution's burden to establish a corpus delicti by way of affirmative evidence. The prosecution's argument tacitly recognizes it has failed to do so.

More specifically, the prosecution theorizes that (1) the cause of Laci's death must be either suicide, accident, or homicide; and (2) because the defense has not proven accident or

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 suicide, the death must be a homicide. That argument does not prove a corpus. As the district attorney acknowledges, it is a basic rule of law that the prosecution must produce evidence, independent of a defendant's own statements, to establish that a crime actually occurred. That is an affirmative obligation. It is not sufficient merely to cite testimony (as the prosecution does here) that would serve to discredit non-criminal alternatives.

As the California Supreme Court explained in *People v. Jones* (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 279, "[t]he corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements: the fact of the injury or loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as to its cause. In any criminal prosecution, the corpus delicti must be established by the prosecution independently from the extrajudicial statements, confessions or admissions of the defendant." (*Id.* at p. 301.) In the present case, the only supposed "evidence" of a criminal cause of death the district attorney cites is the Contra Costa County coroner's classification of the deaths as "homicides." The prosecution, however, does not cite any authority for the proposition that this is sufficient evidence to establish corpus delicti in a homicide case.

The prosecution sets up a "straw man" argument, mischaracterizing the defense position regarding the absence of evidence of a cause of death. The defense does not argue that there cannot be a corpus delicti in the absence of evidence of a cause of death. What the defense does maintain is that the absence of a cause of death coupled with the lack of any other evidence which would establish a corpus precludes any finding of probable cause.

In each of the opinions cited by the prosecution where there was an absence of physical evidence of a criminal act, there was other evidence of a crime which satisfied the corpus delicti requirement. For example, in *People v. Scott* (1959) 176 Cal App. 2d 458, not only had the defendant's wife disappeared, but he delayed reporting the disappearance to the police, and (most importantly) engaged in a series of forgeries to steal his wife's substantial

¹The prosecution makes a cryptic comment in its Opposition regarding an "allegation regarding Conner's death while inside the womb." (Opposition 4:6-12). Although the defense cannot decipher the point the prosecution is trying to argue, that paragraph appears to confirm that the district attorney takes the position that Conner died *in utero*, and that the charges regarding both Laci and Conner, therefore, would share the same corpus delicti.

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27 28 assets after her disappearance. (Id. at p. 499.) That additional criminal conduct was found sufficient to provide a corpus delicti in the absence of a body. (See also, e.g., People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 876, 931-932 [discovery of body of victim, who disappeared at time of another murder, buried in defendant's backyard, established corpus delicti]; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 978, 1057 [body being bound in a trash bag on side of road raised reasonable inference of criminal agency in death]; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 334, 369 [Fact that female victim's body was unclothed at time of discovery, with trauma, provided reasonable inference of rape, satisfying corpus delicti]; People v. Smart (1986) 179 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865-66 [fact that dead infant was found wrapped in blanket and concealed under pile of debris showed criminal agency]; Government of Virgin Islands v. Harris (1991) 938 F.2d 401, 417-18 [among other things, defendant in "no body" case seen at time of victim's disappearance with blood on his clothing and in bedroom, had made threats toward victim]; People v. Johnson (1991) 23 Cal. App. 3d 425, 440-41 [in "no body" case the defendant had a history of violence against the victim]; People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 586, 610-11 [where defendant showed no concern regarding disappearance of prior wife, subsequent wife and son were shot and buried in defendant's yard, and all victims had expressed fear of defendant's violent nature, there was sufficient evidence to support corpus delicti for murder of the victim who had disappeared even in absence of body].)

Here, in contrast, the district attorney has failed to provide any evidence that a criminal agency caused Laci's and Conner's deaths - no realistic criminal motive, no surrounding criminal conduct, no history of violence, and no physical evidence. Thus, the prosecution here has failed to satisfy even the liberal standard established by the "no body" cases it relies upon in the Opposition. That being the case, the information should be set aside.

B. The Physical Evidence Does Not Support Probable Cause.

The prosecution relies on its alleged "hair evidence" to establish probable cause. The prosecution states: "the clear inference from the evidence is that the defendant used the pliers in his attempt to hide Laci Peterson's body in the boat and her hair fragments stuck to the

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pliers." The prosecution is gravely mistaken, and its reliance on this evidence is unfounded.

First, the evidence was found on a pair of rusted pliers that were shown not to have been recently used. Second, a single hair found on a pair of pliers belonging to a husband is not in itself extraordinary or incriminating, and is therefore not worthy of any weight in this death penalty case.

Third, the testimony at the preliminary hearing established that the manner in which the hair on the pliers was handled exposed the hair evidence to a significant risk of contamination and alteration. This was illustrated by the transmutation of the single stand into two. Reports prepared over a course of two months by the officers present during the search of the warehouse indicated that only a single hair was collected, and the photograph of the pliers taken during the search showed only a single hair. Yet when detectives obtained the evidence to conduct a forensic examination, the single hair had somehow become two. (RT 1408).

In addition, the color of the two strands of hair were different from each other. Criminalist Rod Oswalt testified that one hair was brown to light brown, whereas the other strand of hair was considerably darker. (RT 1379, 1386, 1391). Moreover, Mr. Oswalt testified that there was a considerable difference in the cuticle thickness between the two hairs. (RT 1389). One hair had a cuticle thickness of 2.5 micrometers, whereas the other had a cuticle thickness of 3.5 micrometers. (RT 1390).

Furthermore, there was no testimony indicating that the hairs had not been transferred passively onto the pliers. In fact, Mr. Oswalt specifically denied the district attorney's contention that these hairs were torn and not shed. (RT 1401). Mr. Oswalt testified that one could not discern whether or not the hairs were shed because there was no root present.²

²It is also important to note that Detectives Darren Ruskamp and Hendee were the detectives assigned to search the 14-foot aluminum boat, which was found inside the warehouse. Both Detective Ruskamp and Detective Hendee, however, were at the Peterson residence earlier that day, where they conducted a search of the child's room. Detectives Ruskamp and Hendee together searched the entire room, including the crib, the dressers, and the closet, and made a close examination of the floor. Therefore, it is possible (and very likely) that the detectives inadvertently transferred some hairs of Laci Peterson's from the residence to the boat which they subsequently searched.

C. The Circumstantial Evidence Does Not Support Probable Cause.

The prosecution has essentially admitted that it is pursuing a circumstantial case against Mr. Peterson, but in cobbling together various scraps of circumstantial evidence it has failed to establish probable cause that Mr. Peterson killed Laci and Conner. Instead, the prosecution mixes together various unrelated portions of testimony, and hopes that an inference of guilt emerges by some sort of alchemy. Fortunately, the law requires something more than this to establish probable cause. The Opposition provides no explanation about how an inference of guilt may be inferred from the scattershot testimony the prosecution has tossed together.

The prosecution's argument starts with the assertion that Mr. Peterson's statement that he went fishing in San Francisco Bay was the "exact area" where the bodies were found, and that fact alone is sufficient to satisfy probable cause. In fact, however, the bodies were not found in the "exact area" where Mr. Peterson said he went fishing, but in the same large body of water in the middle of a major metropolitan area of many millions of people, crisscrossed by bridges and boats, with a vast shoreline. Using the prosecution's logic, there would be probable cause to bind over for trial any person who had access to the Bay. Mr. Peterson's presence at the Bay (along with tens of thousands of other people that day) is not sufficient to establish probable cause.

The Opposition implies that there was something insidious about Mr. Peterson's purchase of a fishing boat in early December, but fails to explain how the testimony that family members did not know about the boat could possibly support a finding of probable cause. Although opaque, the Opposition appears to urge two contradictory theories regarding the boat and the fishing trip: One, that Mr. Peterson planned the fishing trip and purchase of the boat to establish an alibi and dispose of the body; and two, that Mr. Peterson "hid" the purchase of the boat to conceal his plans to do away with Laci. The prosecution does not attempt to reconcile these theories, and they cannot be reconciled. If Mr. Peterson's "alibi" was going to be a fishing trip, why would he keep the boat purchase a secret? And if the boat purchase was a secret, why would he use a fishing trip as an alibi? Finally, how does the

prosecution think Mr. Peterson was going to "hide" a fourteen-foot skiff upon the disappearance of his wife? This supposed "evidence" does not speak for itself. It was the prosecution's obligation to describe some coherent theory of probable cause connecting the circumstances of the boat purchase to a homicide. It has failed to do so.

In the absence of any coherent theory of probable cause, the Opposition mixes mentions of the boat purchase with testimony regarding Mr. Peterson's statements to his mistress Amber Frey - apparently in the hopes that proximity on the page would serve as a substitute for actual probable cause. Again, the Opposition does not explain how one may deduce probable cause from the testimony, it merely assumes probable cause. In fact, Mr. Peterson's supposed statements to his mistress are not proof of murder - they are proof of adultery. Reasonably viewed, the evasive statements are nothing more that what they appear to be, the maneuvers by an unfaithful husband to keep a mistress. They do not support an inference of murder.

The prosecution accuses Mr. Peterson of "lying" about whether he left the house at 9:30 or 10:00. The prosecution has no evidence, however, that the half-hour discrepancy was deliberate, and does not explain how Mr. Peterson's possible error about the precise time he left home amounts to probable cause of murder. Nor does the prosecution explain how a supposed "lie" about the color of the pants Laci was wearing the morning of her disappearance supports probable cause. Likewise, the Opposition states that Mr. Peterson, after news reports about searches for Laci in the Bay, visited the Berkeley Marina, but does not provide a clue about how that evidence would support a probable cause finding.

In short, the prosecution appears not to have any coherent theory of its case. To oppose Mr. Peterson's Motion to Set Aside the Information, the district attorney was obligated to explain how the testimony elicited at the preliminary hearing would lead a reasonable person to believe Mr. Peterson was guilty of murder. Instead, the prosecution chose to work backward. It simply assumes that Scott Peterson is guilty, repeats the raw

³The prosecution misrepresents the evidence that Mr. Peterson viewed "tide tables" on the internet. In fact, the tide information was part of a fishing web site that was accessed on Mr. Peterson's computer. (RT 1588).

testimony made before the preliminary hearing, and ignores the wide gap between the evidence and the conclusion. The prosecution cannot muster a logical and reasonable theory of the case to bridge that gap.

The Opposition provides an excellent example of the prosecution's attitude toward this case. The district attorney defends the Modesto Police Department's failure, only two days into the missing-person investigation, to follow-up on Diane Campos's statement that on the day Laci disappeared she had seen a woman matching Laci's description confronted by two hostile men. The district attorney baldly states that it was "impossible for the woman who Diane Campos claimed to have seen to be Laci Peterson." (Opp. 15:23-24). That has been the police and prosecution position since the beginning of this case. According to them, for anyone but Mr. Peterson to have caused this tragedy is "impossible." That unfortunate attitude infected the investigation of Laci's disappearance, it infected the investigation of Laci's and Conner's death, and it infects Mr. Peterson's prosecution.

The prosecution must be held to a higher standard. There is no probable cause in this case. The information must be set aside.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should grant the Defendant's Motion, and should set aside the Information.

Dated: January 13, 2004

Respectfully submitted,

GERAGOS & GERAGOS

By:

MARK 1. GENACOS
Attorney for Defendant
SCOTT LEE PETERSON

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FAX STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 350 S. Grand Avenue, 39th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071.

On execution date set forth below, I served the following

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REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE INFORMATION

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X transmitting by facsimile transmission the above document to the attorneys listed below at their receiving facsimile telephone numbers. The sending facsimile machine I used, with telephone number (213) 625-1600, complied with C.R.C. Rule 2003(3). The transmission was reported as complete and without error.

personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the party or parties listed below, or to their respective agents or employees.

PARTIES SERVED BY FAX:

Rick Disatso, DDA David P. Harris, DDA Fax No.: 209-525-5545 Kirk McAllister McAllister & McAllister Fax No.:209-575-0240

Executed on January 13, 2004, at Los Angeles, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

OSLIN RUDE