
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Attorney for Petitioner



# SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA

### COUNTY OF STANISLAUS

Petitioner.

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D.A. Number 1056770

VS.

SCOTT LEE PETERSON, ...

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA | No. 1056770

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

REGARDING ISSUE OF

SECTION 170.6

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Defendant.

## Facts

On March 3, 2003 the Modesto Bee filed a Petition in the Superior court seeking access to the search warrants in the "Laci Peterson Investigation." The case was captioned "In re 8 sealed search warrants - Laci Peterson investigation" and was assigned case number 1045098 by the court. The case was assigned to the Honorable Judge A. Girolami for hearing. The Modesto Bee also filed a companion Petition to unseal search warrants in the "Carmen Sabatino investigation" under case number 1045110, which was also assigned to the same court. Judge Girolami recused himself from the

Sabatino case (number 1045110) but not the "Peterson investigation" matter. The People filed a C.C.P. §170.6 in case number 1045098.

#### <u>Issue</u>

Does the People's §170.6 challenge in case number 1045098 apply to this criminal case?

#### <u>Law</u>

Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 states in part:

"(1) No judge, court commissioner, or referee of any superior court of the State of California shall try any civil or criminal action or special proceeding of any kind or character nor hear any matter therein that involves a contested issue of law or fact when it shall be established as hereinafter provided that the judge or court commissioner is prejudiced against any party or attorney or the interest of any party or attorney appearing in the action or proceeding.

(2) Any party to or any attorney appearing in any such action or proceeding may establish this prejudice by an oral or written motion without notice supported by affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury or an oral statement under oath that the judge, court commissioner, or referee before whom the action or proceeding is pending or to whom it is assigned is prejudiced against any such party or attorney or the interest of the party or attorney so that the party or attorney cannot or believes that he or she cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge, court commissioner, or referee. Where the judge, other than a judge assigned to the case for all purposes, court commissioner, or referee assigned to or who is scheduled to try the cause or hear the matter is known at least 10 days before the date set for trial or hearing, the motion shall be made at least five days before that date. If directed to the trial of a cause where there is a master calendar, the motion shall be made to the judge supervising the master calendar not later than

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1 the time the cause is assigned for trial. directed to the trial of a cause that has been assigned to a judge for all purposes, the 2 motion shall be made to the assigned judge or to the presiding judge by a party within 10 days after notice of the all purpose 3 assignment, or if the party has not yet 4 appeared in the action, then within 10 days after the appearance. If the court in which the 5 action is pending is authorized to have no more б than one judge and the motion claims that the duly elected or appointed judge of that court is prejudiced, the motion shall be made before the expiration of 30 days from the date of the 7 8 first appearance in the action of the party who is making the motion or whose attorney is making the motion. In no event shall any judge, court commissioner, or referee entertain the 9 motion if it be made after the drawing of the 10 name of the first juror, or if there be no jury, after the making of an opening statement by counsel for plaintiff, or if there is no 11 such statement, then after swearing in the 12 first witness or the giving of any evidence or after trial of the cause has otherwise 13 commenced. If the motion is directed to a hearing (other than the trial of a cause), the 14 motion shall be made not later than the commencement of the hearing. In the case of 15 trials or hearings not herein specifically provided for, the procedure herein specified shall be followed as nearly as may be. The fact that a judge, court commissioner, or referee 16 17 has presided at or acted in connection with a 18 pretrial conference or other hearing, proceeding or motion prior to trial and not 19 involving a determination of contested fact issues relating to the merits shall not 20 preclude the later making of the motion provided for herein at the time and in the manner hereinbefore provided.  $\cdot 21$ A motion under this paragraph may be made 22 following reversal on appeal of a trial court's decision, or following reversal on appeal of a trial court's final judgment, if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is assigned to 23 conduct a new trial on the matter. 24 Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of this section, the party who filed the appeal that resulted in 25 the reversal of a final judgment of a trial court may make a motion under this section 26 regardless of whether that party or side has previously done so. The motion shall be made 27

within 60 days after the party or the party's attorney has been notified of the assignment. (3) If the motion is duly presented and the 2 affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury is duly filed or such oral statement .3 under oath is duly made, thereupon and without any further act or proof, the judge supervising 4 the master calendar, if any, shall assign some other judge, court commissioner, or referee to try the cause or hear the matter. In other 5 cases, the trial of the cause or the hearing of 6 the matter shall be assigned or transferred to another judge, court commissioner, or referee 7 of the court in which the trial or matter is 8 pending or, if there is no other judge, court commissioner, or referee of the court in which the trial or matter is pending, the Chair of the Judicial Council shall assign some other 9 10 judge, court commissioner, or referee to try the cause or hear the matter as promptly as possible. Except as provided in this section, no party or attorney shall be permitted to make 12 more than one such motion in any one action or special proceeding pursuant to this section; and in actions or special proceedings where 13 there may be more than one plaintiff or similar party or more than one defendant or similar 14 party appearing in the action or special proceeding, only one motion for each side may 15 be made in any one action or special proceeding. (4) Unless required for the convenience of the 16 court or unless good cause is shown, a continuance of the trial or hearing shall not 17 be granted by reason of the making of a motion under this section. If a continuance is 18 granted, the cause or matter shall be continued from day to day or for other limited periods 19 upon the trial or other calendar and shall be reassigned or transferred for trial or hearing 20 as promptly as possible. (Emphasis added.)

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In the case of <u>Le Louis v. Superior Court</u>, (1989) 209 Cal.App. 3d 669, the court defined an action and a special proceeding:

"Judicial remedies are divided into two classes:
(1) actions and (2) special proceedings. (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 21.) An action is an ordinary proceeding
in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes
another for the declaration, enforcement, or

protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 22.) Every other remedy is a special proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 23.) Actions are of two kinds: (1) civil and (2) criminal. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 24.) The Penal Code defines and provides for the prosecution of a criminal action. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 31.) "The proceeding by which a party charged with a public offense is accused and brought to trial and punishment, is known as a criminal action." (Pen. Code, §§ 683.)"

Id, at 677.

In the case of <u>Stephens v. Superior Court</u>, (2002)96 Cal.App.4th 54,61-62 the court determined the standard of reviewing a peremptory challenge, saying:

"As a remedial statute, section 170.6 is to be liberally construed in favor of allowing a peremptory challenge, and a challenge should be denied only if the statute absolutely forbids it. (People v. Superior Court (Williams), supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 697-698.)"

In Lyons v. Superior Court, (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 625, a defendant entered a conditional guilty plea in municipal court. After a superior court judge refused to accept the plea, the matter was remanded to the municipal court where the defendant entered a different conditional guilty plea. When the matter was assigned to the same superior court judge who had rejected the first plea, the defendant filed a disqualification motion. It was timely. The "hearing on the second plea bargain ... is a separate proceeding from the hearing on the original plea bargain. When the plea was rejected the matter was remanded to the municipal court

for further proceedings. Potentially those further proceedings could have resulted in another plea.... In any event, when the matter was thereafter certified again to the superior court ..., a new file number was given to the case. The hearing on the new conditional plea is not merely a 'continuation of the main proceeding' [citations], but rather a separate proceeding in which different determinations might be reached." (Id. at pp. 628-629. Emphasis added.)

In <u>Paredes v. Superior Court</u>, (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 24, 32-33, the court said:

"Subdivision (3) of the statute bars any party from making more than one motion 'in any one action or special proceeding;' by negative implication, in two successive actions a party may move to disqualify in each, or may disqualify in the later action without waiving that right by failing to so move in the earlier. The wording of the statute thus appears to foreclose any argument premised on the doctrine of collateral estoppel." (Solberg v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 190, fn. 6."

In the case before the bench the People have not exercised a peremptory challenge. The case at bench is a criminal action and did not come into existence until the defendant was charged. (See <u>Le Louis v. Superior Court</u>, supra, at 677.) The prior action involving the Modesto Bee was a separate action and had a separate case number. (See <u>Lyons v. Superior Court</u>, supra, at 629.) The statute is to be liberally construed to allow a party to exercise a challenge; the People have not exercised that right in this action and therefore

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retain that right until further application of the statute. The Modesto Bee action is a separate action within the meaning of the statute and the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable. (See <u>Solberg v. Superior Court</u>, (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 190, fn. 6.)

The fact that this case is a special circumstance case or according to the defense, may involve issues that were raised in the Modesto Bee case does not change this analysis. In the case of Waldon v. Superior Court, (1987)196 Cal.App.3d 809 the court said that a Penal Code section 1368 proceeding was separate and distinct from the criminal action from which it arose. The defendant was therefore entitled to exercise a separate section 170.6 challenges in the competency hearing and the criminal action. Waldon was a death penalty case.

## Conclusion

The People have not exercised a peremptory challenge in this case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §170.6 and the People's challenge in action number 1045098 does not apply to this case. Action

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
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1045098 does also not collaterally effect the People in this case.

Dated this 3rd day of May, 2003, at Modesto, California.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES C. BRAZELTON District Attorney



David P. Harris Senior Deputy District Attorney