FILED 1 GERAGOS & GERAGOS A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION . JUL 22 M 8: 17 2 LAWYERS CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 39™ FLOOR 3 COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 350 S. GRAND AVENUE LOS ANGELES, CA 90071-3480 TELEPHONE (213) 625-3900 FACSIMILE (213) 625-1600 5 MARK J. GERAGOS SBN 108325 6 Attorney for Defendant SCOTT LEE PETERSON McALLISTER & McALLISTER, Inc. 1012 11th Street, Suite 100 Modesto, CA 95354 KIRK W. McALLISTER SBN 47324 8 Attorney for Defendant SCOTT LEE PETERSON FILED BY FAX 10 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 FOR THE COUNTY OF STANISLAUS 13 14 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Case No. 1056770 CALIFORNIA. 15 MOTION TO CLOSE Plaintiff, PRELIMINARY HEARING 16 VS. [Penal Code section 868] 17 DATE: August 14, 2003 18 SCOTT LEE PETERSON, TIME: 8:30 a.m. PLACE: Dept 2 19 Defendant. 20 21 STANISLAUS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY; and TO: 22 CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: TO: 23 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 14, 2003 at the hour of 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Defendant Scott Lee Peterson ("Mr. Peterson"), 24 through counsel, will move this Court for an order directing that the preliminary hearing 25 26 in this matter shall be closed pursuant to Penal Code section 868. The Motion will be 27 based upon the grounds that said closure is necessary to protect Mr. Peterson's right to a fair and impartial trial and that no less restrictive means exist for protecting said right. 28

GERAGOS & GERAGOS

The Motion will be based on this Notice, the attached memorandum of points and 1 authorities, the pleadings and records on file herein, and upon such other and further argument as may be presented to the Court at the hearing of this matter. 3 4 Dated: July 21, 2003 5 Respectfully submitted, 6 GERAGOS PERAGOS 7 8 By: 9 Attorney for Defendant SCOTT LEE PETERSON 10 11 12 **MOTION** Scott Lee Peterson, by and through counsel, hereby moves the Court for an order: 13 Closing the preliminary hearing in this matter; and, 14 1. Granting whatever other relief the Court may deem necessary to further the 15 2. 16 ends of justice. 17 Dated: July 21, 2003 18 Respectfully submitted, 19 GERAGOS FOR GERAGOS 20 21 By: 22 Attorney for Defendant 23 24 25 26 27 28

MOTION TO CLOSE PRELIMINARY HEARING

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PROLOGUE

[I]n the unique facts of this case, there is a clear and present danger [of serious imminent threat to a protected interest] because of the modern media's capability easily to store and recall bits of information in order to relate them at any time including during jury selection. Further compounded in this case is the effect that the publicity is nationwide and cannot be automatically cured by a change of venue or extensive voir dire. If witnesses are allowed to discuss publicly their expected testimony or if trial counsel or their staff are allowed to comment on strategy or on the weight of the evidence, even if jurors can be found that are willing to be fair and impartial, it may never be known if a juror were to rely consciously or subconsciously on the out-of-court information.

Although the Court is extremely concerned with the due process and fair trial rights in this case, it is also keenly aware of the public's right of access to the proceedings herein and the right of free speech of the participants. However, after balancing these rights, and in order to protect against disruption of the proper administration of justice, the Court finds that good cause exists for the issuance of a pre-trial Protective Order.

(People of the State of California v. Scott Lee Peterson, Stanislaus County Superior Court case number 1056770, June 12, 2003 Protective Order/Decision at page 3.)

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Court has already found that the unique circumstances surrounding the prosecution of Mr. Peterson require the imposition of a protective order in order to protect Mr. Peterson's (and the prosecution's) right to a fair and impartial trial. The Court has also found probable cause to hold a future hearing inquiring into whether the prosecuting District Attorney, James Brazelton, has violated the protective order by stating that the prosecution would "open some eyes" at the preliminary hearing. As this Court noted in the June 12, 2003 protective order, the United States Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) 384 U.S. 333 stated,

[i]t is obvious that the judge should have further sought to alleviate this problem by imposing control over the statements made to the news media by counsel, witnesses and especially the Coroner and police officers. The prosecution repeatedly made evidence available to the new media, which was never offered in the trial. Much of the 'evidence' disseminated in this fashion was clearly inadmissible. The exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news media make it available to the public.

(July 12, 2003 protective order at page 3, quoting Sheppard.)

Given, inter alia, (1) this Court's prior findings concerning the prejudice to Mr. Peterson's right to a fair trial created by the intense media attention that plagues this case; (2) District Attorney Brazelton's improper commentary regarding what will supposedly transpire during the preliminary hearing; and Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that the Court close the preliminary hearing to the public so that further prejudice can be avoided - particularly in light of the fact that the defense is (and will be) unable to publicly respond to any prosecutorial misconduct or false media reports stemming from the preliminary hearing.

3 4

5 6

7 8

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25 26

27

28

The defense is particularly concerned with the danger that this prosecution team will attempt to utilize the preliminary hearing as a vehicle to disseminate bogus "evidence" and theories that will not be admissible at trial and that the prosecution has no intention of introducing at trial. As correctly predicted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sheppard, the exclusion of inadmissible evidence or offers of proof that are based on proposed evidentiary theories will be rendered meaningless if the preliminary hearing is open to the public and covered wall to wall in the national media. In addition, as this Court has noted that "[t]he local print media rarely does not have a daily front page article on this matter." (June 12, 2003 protective order at page 1.)

Since at the present time with discovery still proceeding at best at a glacial pace there is no way to predict what evidence the prosecution might seek to introduce and the defense is unable six weeks away to predict what possible affirmative defenses will be presented there is no less restrictive means to protect Mr. Peterson's rights than total closure of the preliminary hearing.

II.

THE COURT MUST CLOSE THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TO PROTECT MR. PETERSON'S RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL

Penal Code section 868 permits a defendant to request that all persons (other than statutorily specified persons) be excluded from his preliminary hearing.11 The United States Supreme Court has found that under California law, a preliminary hearing may be closed if specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. (See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside (1984) 464 U.S. 501, 510.) ("Press-Enterprise I")

Section 868 provides in pertinent part:

The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial[.]

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Subsequently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its findings in Press-Enterprise ĩ Company, etc. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1 ("Press-Enterprise II"). In Press-Enterprise II the Court noted, 3 4 If the interest asserted [in support of closing the hearing] is 5 the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights. See Press-Enterprise I, supra; Richmond Newspapers, supra, 448 U.S., at 581, 100 S.Ct,, at 2829. (Press-Enterprise II at 14.)

The California Supreme Court recently acknowledged the continuing validity of the Press-Enterprise cases in noting that a preliminary hearing may be closed pursuant to Penal Code section 868 upon the making of,

GERAGOS&GFRAGOS

specific, on the record findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values of overriding interest . . . [including] the interest in providing a fair trial. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1206-1207.)

The NBC Susidiary court also noted the two-prong inquiry required by the Press-Enterprise cases in determining whether to close a preliminary hearing. (See NBC Subsidiary at 1207, (preliminary hearing shall be closed only if (1) specific findings are made demonstrating substantial probability of prejudice that closure would prevent, and (2) reasonable alternatives will not protect the defendant's rights.)

2 3

4 5

6

7 8

9

10

11 12

13 14

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25 26

27

28

As noted above, this Court has already made numerous on-the-record findings that publicity in this matter has and will continue to prejudice Mr. Peterson's right to a fair and impartial trial. The Court has also found that there was no less restrictive means of protecting Mr. Peterson's right to a fair trial than the imposition of a comprehensive "gag" order. In terms of the unprecedented media attention given to this matter, nothing has changed since the Court's June 12, 2003 Order. However, in terms of the ongoing discovery and investigation, significant developments have occurred - - developments further necessitating the closure of the preliminary hearing.

Specifically, within the past week, the defense is in receipt of discovery that is not only exculpatory, but which the defense contends totally exonerates Mr. Peterson. The defense further believes this exonerating evidence will likely be introduced during the preliminary hearing. However, the evidence, which demonstrates Mr. Peterson's innocence, also provides evidence of the true killer or killers' modus operandi and provides clues as to the method of and circumstances surrounding the killings. Therefore, if the evidence is made public the ability of both the prosecution and defense to ascertain the identity of the actual perpetrator(s) will be irreparably prejudiced. This is clearly prejudicial to Mr. Peterson's right to a fair and impartial trial and requires that the preliminary hearing be closed pursuant to Section 868 so that Mr. Peterson (and the prosecution) and continue to pursue leads as to the identity of the killer or killers.2

The defense also believes the appellate proceedings concerning Judge Beauchesne and his June 12, 2003 unsealing order demonstrate the prejudice that will occur if the preliminary hearing is open to the public. In its May 5, 2003 opinion in case number F042848, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District noted that "[t]he trial court's findings that prejudice to both the prosecution and defense would result from

²The defense is prepared to make an in camera offer of proof regarding the exonerating evidence. Additionally, as much as the defense might desire to have the evidence made public, the defense is concerned with maintaining the confidentiality of the evidence so that the actual perpetrators will not be alerted to the existence of the evidence.

3

5

6 7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27 28 disclosure of [search warrants] stand unchallenged." (Opinion at 4.) The Court of Appeal further noted that,

A criminal investigation does not automatically cease upon the filing of a complaint or upon the passage of an arbitrary period of time. The Findings themselves implicitly recognize that the investigation would likely continue for a substantial period, certainly more than the 11 days which elapsed before the complaint was filed.

Moreover, the Findings expressly recognize that the disclosure of the '[i]nvestigation techniques, clues and focus on future avenues of inquiry by law enforcement personnel would unduly alert any potential suspect. Evidence would likely be destroyed and witnessed would be reluctant to provide information.' These considerations would conceivably disappear only if the complaint was filed against the actual perpetrator or perpetrators, but an accurate identification of a perpetrator has yet to be made and legally will not be made by the filing of a complaint against a particular suspect. As we see it, the portion of the trial court's order requiring disclosure upon the filing of a complaint or the arrival of a specific date in the future is based upon an erroneous assumption - - that an arrest or the lapse of time would remove the possibility, among others, that a 'potential suspect' would be alerted, that the evidence would be destroyed, or that witnesses would be discouraged.

(May 5, 2003 Opinion at 4-5.)

The Court of Appeal properly noted that the considerations requiring sealing in this case would disappear only if the complaint was filed against the actual perpetrator or

perpetrators.31 The recent discovery provided by the prosecution negates any possibility that Mr. Peterson committed this horrific crime. Consequently, in order to safeguard the ability of the defense (and prosecution) to identify the actual perpetrator(s), thereby exonerating Mr. Peterson, the preliminary hearing must be closed.

///

³More recently, on June 27, 2003, in connection with a petition filed by Mr. Peterson (case number F043260), the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District has, inter alia, stayed Judge Beauchesne's June 12, 2003 unsealing order. No final ruling has been made on Mr. Peterson's petition, but the Court of Appeal requested briefing by all parties as to the propriety of peremptory relief. The parties' final briefs were all filed on or before July 7, 2003.

į

2

3

4

5

6

8

Q

10

11

III.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that the relief sought herein be granted and that the Court make specific, on-the-record findings including, but not limited to, the facts that: (1) the Court's findings upon which the June 12, 2003 protective order were based have not changed and are applicable to the requested closure of the preliminary hearing; (2) the considerations noted by the Court of Appeal in case number F042848 are applicable herein and compel this Court to close the preliminary hearing in order to protect Mr. Peterson's right to a fair and impartial trial; and, (3) based on the unique circumstances of this case previously noted by this Court 4' there is no less restrictive means of protecting Mr. Peterson's right to a fair and impartial trial.

13

15

16

17

18

12

14 Dated: July 21, 2003

Respectfully submitted,

GERAGOS & GERAGOS

By:

MARK I. GERAGOS Attorney for Defendant SCOUT LEE PETERSON

20

19

21

22 23

24

25

26 27

28

'(e.g. "tremendous amount of pre-trial publicity", "publicity has been massive" (June 12, 2003 protective order at 1.), "nature of the publicity is especially troubling" (Protective Order at 2.); "if this case were to proceed to trial without a Protective Order in place until shortly before jury selection, all the statements by the witnesses, all of the rumors and gossip would be rehashed shortly before trial thereby making it extremely difficult to select a fair and impartial jury" (Protective Order at 3.); "there is a clear and present danger [of prejudice]" (Protective Order at 3.) All of these circumstances are applicable to the preliminary hearing and should be considered by the Court in its ruling upon the instant motion.

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FAX STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 350 S. Grand Avenue, 39th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071.

On execution date set forth below, I served the following

DOCUMENTS OR DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED AS:

MOTION TO CLOSE PRELIMINARY HEARING

placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes with postage thereon fully prepaid, to the attorneys and their perspective addresses listed below, in the United States Mail at Los Angeles, California.

X transmitting by facsimile transmission the above document to the attorneys listed below at their receiving facsimile telephone numbers. The sending facsimile machine I used, with telephone number (213) 625-1600, complied with C.R.C. Rule 2003(3). The transmission was reported as complete and without error.

personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the party or parties listed below, or to their respective agents or employees.

PARTIES SERVED BY FAX:

Rick Disatso, DDA David P. Harris, DDA Fax No.: 209-525-5545

Executed on July 21, 2003 at Los Angeles, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

JOSLIN RUDD

GERAGOS & GERAGOS

39th FLOOR

350 S. GRAND AVENUE

Los Angeles, CA 90071-3480

TEL: (213) 625-3900 FAX: (213) 625-1600

FAX COVER SHEET

From:

Mark J. Geragos

Client/Matter:

Peterson

Date:

July 21, 2003

Pages:

| (INCLUDING COVER)

RECIPIENT	FACSIMILE NUMBER
Deputy District Attorney Rick Distaso	(209) 525-5545

COMMENTS:

The information contained in this facsimile message is information protected by attorney-client and/or the attorney/work product privilege. It is intended only for the use of the individual named above. If the person actually receiving this facsimile is not the named recipient or agent responsible to deliver it to the named recipient, any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of the communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately.

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, PLEASE TELEPHONE US IMMEDIATELY AT (213)625-3900

TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT

TIME NAME FAX

07/21/2003 18:56 GERAGOS&GERAGOS

TEL SER #

2136251600 2136253900 BROL 21854126

DATE, TIME FAX NO./NAME DURATION PAGE(S) RESULT MODE

07/21 18:54 12095255545 00:02:05 11 OK STANDARD

GERAGOS & GERAGOS

LAWYERS 39™ FLOOR

350 S. GRAND AVENUE

Los Angeles, CA 90071-3480

TEL: (213) 625-3900 FAX: (213) 625-1600

FAX COVER SHEET

From:

Mark J. Geragos

Client/Matter:

Peterson

Date:

July 21, 2003

Pages:

| | (INCLUDING COVER)

Deputy District Attorney Rick Distaso (209) 525-5545